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Abstract: This text describes the social aspects of Total's CO2 integrated capture, transport and 
storage pilot project in southwestern France, from the initial press conference February 8th, 2007 to 
the formal opening in January 2010. The economic and social context was favorable. The company 
conducted a significant outreach campaign. It was followed by an effective involvement of 
stakeholders, if not of the general public, through a formal continuous deliberation process led by 
the public authorities.
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1. Introduction
This case study describes the social aspects of Total's CO2 capture, transport and storage (CCS) 
research pilot project in Lacq inaugurated in 2010. Apart from enhanced oil recovery projects or 
projects where the captured CO2 is a fatal byproduct of another industrial process, this is one of the 
first integrated CCS projects in the world at this scale. During the two years of the experiment, 
about 50,000 metric tons of CO2 per year will be captured from a steam production unit retrofitted 
with oxycombustion in collaboration with Air Liquide. The captured gas is compressed and 
transported for about 30km reusing an existing natural gas pipeline. The gas is then injected through 
a reworked existing well into the depleted natural gas field of Rousse 1 rock formation 4,500 meters 
underground. Injected CO2 quantities are low compared to initial natural gas quantities: The 
reservoir pressure, currently 30 bars, should be increased to 70 bars post injection, which remains 
well below the initial pressure of 480 bars.
The project is conducted at Total's Lacq plant, in southwestern France. It includes a comprehensive 
monitoring network. And in addition to the research based on science and engineering, it 
contributed to advances on the legal and social aspects of CCS in France and in Europe. The social 
aspect's significance arise from the relatively high stakes: a large population lives close to the 
storage area, and this is the first integrated CCS project in France. After describing the context, this 
text will tell the project's story in two parts: before and after the official permit request. The final 
section summarizes the lessons learned and concludes. Additional online material includes an 
interactive version of the timeline and a map1.
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2. Historical context
Total's integrated CCS pilot project takes place in a valley along the Gave de Pau river, in the 
Béarn cultural area, in the Pyrénées Atlantiques (64) department of France.
The Lacq natural gas field was discovered accidentally at -3 550 m while digging for oil in 1951. It 
has been an important national asset for France, providing up to one third of the domestic natural 
gas consumption. Production peaked in 1982 at 33 million m³/day. But the flow has declined to 
under 10 million m³/day by 2009, and the end of the field's economic life is announced for 2013. As 
Illustration 1 shows, there are now many empty lots in Lacq's processing plant. After 50 years of 
natural gas bonanza, economic development plans for the valley are being reinvented. Several 
specialty chemicals production facilities, a bioethanol plant, a carbon fiber plant and a combined 
cycle power plant have been attracted. In this context where the economic future of the area is at 
stake, Total's announcement of the carbon capture and storage project had a clear value to the 
community. The project fits with the firm's broader strategy to manage responsibly the plant 
shutdown, not only by supporting local small and medium enterprises through its subsidiary 'Total 
DDR' but also by directly investing in training and R&D activities on the platform.
Lacq's natural gas is very dangerous, because it contains 16% H2S and 10% CO2. The gas is so 
corrosive that when the plant opened in 1957, special steels had to be developed [1]. Yet the 
processing plant's safety record shows no fatal accident outside it, even though some inhabitants 
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Illustration 1: Aerial view of the Lacq natural gas processing plant. Empty lots show the decline in  
industrial activity. Industrial risk and harmful effects do not prevent people from living close to the  
site (red dot). Image (c) Geoportail.
live very close as Illustration 1 shows. The risk is not only present near the plant. The gas field 
extends dozens of kilometers beyond Lacq, reaching under the city of Pau. Consequently there is a 
wide network of collection pipelines in the area. These may have a low impact for newly installed 
inhabitants. But local citizens can have a memory or direct knowledge of the visual, air and noise 
pollutions that come from living in a valley rich in heavy industries [2]. Local institutions have 
experience with managing dangerous gases and pipelines risks.
According to [3], since the beginning of oil and gas production in the area, various liquid streams 
have been re-injected in the geologic structures. Some of these liquids came from the underground 
fields themselves, some came from the processing plant. Injection of liquid waste from other 
chemical plants in the industrial park is presently authorized in the geologic formation known as 
"Crétacé 4000". Injection rate were maximal in 1978-1979 at about 1 000 m3/day, at a cost around 
10 €/t. This is an economic opportunity, as some chemical waste streams would require up to 600 
€/t to process otherwise. According to [4] that opportunity is a significant asset for the region, as 
only 2% of the disposal capacity has been used up in 40 years. Following a recommendation by the 
French national commission on public debates (CNDP), in 2001-2002 a concertation took place on 
whether to renew the Cretacé 4000 permit [5],[6]. Even if all this was not tied to the CCS project 
technically, legally or administratively, it contributed to the local political culture of concertation 
about industrial risk and geological injection.
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Illustration 2: Aerial view of the Rousse 1 CO2 injection site in 2009, busy with equipments revising  
the well before injection (arrow). Surrounding landscape is hills covered with low density  
residential lots, wineyards, fields and patches of wood. In the background the cities of Jurançon 
and Pau are at approximately 5 km. Image (c) Total, used with permission.
3. Announcement, social characterization and concertation (2007)
Illustration 3 shows the project's timeline, starting from the February 8th, 2007 first press release 
[7]. The project initially aimed to inject up to 150 000 t CO2 starting at the end of 2008. The cost of 
almost 60 million euros is supported privately by Total. A scientific committee advises the project 
and allows to maximize the research spillovers to the academic world. All leading geological 
research institutions in France: Institut Français du Pétrole (IFP); Bureau de Recherches 
Géologiques et Minières (BRGM); Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques 
(INERIS); University of Pau Pays de l'Adour (UPPA); Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris 
(IPGP) as well as TNO are scientifically collaborating.
Total's outreach activities, comprehensively reported on their website [8] were voluntary and started 
well in advance of the administrative process. C&S Conseils, a specialized communication 
consulting company from Paris, helped to study the social context, define the methods, conduct the 
concertation and write the associated materials. The initial announcement was closely followed in 
March 2007 by a public information meeting at Jurançon. This was held with neighbors of the 
Rousse future injection site. Globally, there was no negative feelings at this meeting. The 
discussions were rather questions about the possible consequences, noise or visual impacts, zoning 
change and financial compensations for the city.
A social characterization study to organize the concertation was performed next. Between June and 
September 2007, C&S Conseils conducted about forty interviews with local and regional actors: 
elected representatives including all the mayors of the cities crossed by the pipeline, 
administrations, associations, businesses; and with the members of the project's scientific follow-up 
committee. The study led to the concertation itself, that included:
• Commitment to a "Chartee la concertation" [9] in which the company states the 
transparency guidelines according to which it promises to conduct the concertation. A 
guiding principle was that « All participants to public dialog do not take part in the final 
decision but all participants in the decision making take part in the public dialogue .»
• Publication of a 52 pages brochure [10] and its 8-pages synthesis [11]. The documents is 
organized around four topics: climate change; the CCS technology: the goals and 
characteristics of the pilot project; and the impacts and conditions of implementation.
• A section of about 10 pages on climate change, CCS and the project on Total.com web (5), 
and an exhibit on the project displayed at meeting places and at the Pau airport.
• Oral presentations and Questions/Answers sessions at three public meetings organized in the 
town-halls of Jurançon, Pau and Mourenx. A total audience of about 300 participants 
attended the meetings, each about two and a half hours. Talks by Total representatives were 
complemented and discussed by national experts from outside the project.
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Illustration 3: Timeline of the Lacq pilot CCS project's social aspects. Events in the top part of the  
timeline are directly related to the project, while events in the lower part relate to the broader  
context of CCS in France. An deeper interactive timeline is at  
http://minh.haduong.com/Lacq_CCS_Pilot/timeline/.
Meeting summaries were published on Total's website (5). Discussions with the public about local 
effects were related to security, land value, image risks for other activities like wine growing and 
visual impact on the site. Discussions on regional effects centered on economic attractivity, 
industrial development, jobs and fiscality. General discussions on CSC examined its costs, scale, 
additional energy needs, regulation, public subsidies, long term responsibility and risk control.
According to (6), the outcome of the concertation was first a clarification the agreements and 
disagreements. All participants agreed that climate change is an urgent issue, that increasing energy 
conservation, efficiency and renewables is more important than CCS, that a governance open to 
civil society is a goal to reach, that the project contributes to the economic renewal of the area, and 
that security and mastering the risks is an absolute priority. There was two points of dissent: the 
potential of CCS against climate change, and the regulation under the Mining code, as opposed to 
Environmental laws, especially regarding the legal status of CO2 (waste or not).
There was several substantive outcomes of the concertation. An information day on climate change 
and its mitigation was decided, held on October 2, 2008 in Pau's historical congress center [12]. It 
was agreed to continue the dialogue by setting up a local commission on information and follow-
uppp (Commission Locale d'Information et de Suivi, CLIS). Total promised they "will help local 
projects related to climate change mitigation (provided they are supported by the city)", and that 
discussions on taxes could be opened. Finally, after the concertation the project's neighbors formed 
an association: Coteaux du Jurançon Environment (CJE), officially registered on January 16th, 
2008.
4. Formal dialogue and authorization (2008 to mid 2009)
The Préfecture des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, representing locally the French State, was in charge of 
examining the permit request. This was the first CCS project to be processed in France. The central 
ministry send a framing note to the Prefect (circulaire MEDDAAT du 14 février) early 2008. In 
addition to the existing national regulations on mining, waste, industry and transportation, the draft 
of the EU Directive on CCS was closely considered, even if it was not legally in place yet. Total 
filed the formal authorization request (Demande D'Autorisation d'Exploiter) with the Prefecture des 
Pyrénées Atlantiques in April, 2008.
During the spring of 2008, Total continued the communication and dialog meetings with mayors 
and neighbors, including a workshop with the Jurançon municipal council in July 2008, and an open 
site visit complemented with an information letter to neighbors in December 2008.
Formal discussions on the project were conducted mostly at the CLIS ad-hoc commission. It was 
officially enacted on April 30th, 2008 by the Préfecture des Pyrénées Atlantiques. In the absence of 
CCS law, the CLIS was created using the legal model of commissions established to follow-up 
landfills and the Crétacé 4000 CLIS. It includes the various components of the social body: 4 State 
representatives; 9 locally elected officials; 2 delegates from workers' unions; 4 from associations; 5 
experts and 4 Total employees. The CLIS was established to discuss the authorization request and 
will sit at least for all the project's life. It met 8 times between June 2008 and December 2009.
The CLIS hears formal reports on the project from Total and experts like the BRGM. Its website 
[13], hosted in Préfecture's official website, provides access to the discussions reports and a 
significant range of supporting material. The CLIS visited the installations twice. At the first visit, it 
discussed on site with neighbors, ultimately making a press release about the project, but did not 
conduct a formal public meeting at the storage site. The CLIS also asked for and heard a report on 
the history of accidents with natural gas in the area, reviewed the monitoring plan, security 
exercises, a local perception survey. It reviewed and improved the authorization document draft.
Associations opposing the project, CJE and SEPANSO Béarn (a federation affiliated to France 
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Nature Environment), participated actively in CLIS meetings. At the outset, CJE was initially 
motivated to learn and understand. Its approximately 120 members are from diverse socio-
professionnal background, and includes both rural people established in Jurançon from a long time 
and newly arrived inhabitants. Moderate members are ready to discuss with Total. At the end of the 
summer 2008, the association was not ready to organize big demonstrations, but could mobilize 
reliably a more radical fraction in total opposition to the project.
• CJE's advisor H. Pépin summarized the objections in a column published in a leading 
national newspaper [14]. Total was generally depicted as a big bad corporation that cannot 
be trusted to develop CCS acceptably, viewing its concertation efforts as mostly marketing 
and communication. The risk analysis was criticized for not considering massive release 
scenarios, and the security exercise for not directly involving neighbors.
• Opponents to the project questioned the independence of the BRGM, involved both in the 
project and in reviewing Total's permit request. CJE argued that the project could have been 
reviewed by an inter-disciplinary panel including foreign experts. BRGM replies with four 
arguments. First, BRGM is legitimate to examine the permit request because it is the public 
reference establishment for geosciences. Providing technical expertise to the administration 
is one of the core missions for which it has been created by the government. Second, the 
assessment was made only for the aspects in which the BRGM was competent, the expertise 
was conducted by a newly created unit of 13 specialists of security and impacts of CO2 
storage [15]. Third, this unit's personnel was not implicated in site selection and 
characterisation studies, and BRGM's researches currently led in partnership with Total at 
the Rousse site are disjunct from the injection permit request. Finally, it would have been 
difficult to find CCS experts, that were never involved in a joint research project with Total.
• Disagreements about the share of CCS in climate policies persisted. Opponents stated for 
example that IEA CCS scenarios are over-optimistic. SEPANSO raised these issues. They 
were not accepted as relevant by the CLIS, as they pertains to a national debate on policy 
choices between energy efficiency, renewables and cleaner fossil fuels.
• The opposition requested more technical reports release. Total argued commercial reasons to 
keep some documents non-public, but invited the experts to consult them on their premises. 
The CLIS president noted that the legal recourse against the permit may hinder transparency.
An administrative public enquiry was held from July 21st to September 22nd, 2008 in 4 cities. 
Participation was very weak in Lacq, weak in towns along the pipeline, 90% of the comments were 
received in Jurançon. CJE criticized this administrative public enquiry on the grounds that it was 
conducted during the summer vacations, and the final advice was positive while 56 out of the 60 
recorded comments were negative [16]. The surveyors indeed assessed that the replies by the 
project-holder to the objections raised by the citizens were satisfying. The survey is not a vote, and 
60 self-selected voices, that is less than 1% of the population, are not representative.
A final technical problem had to be examined before injection: signals from the three seismic 
sensors at the bottom of the well were lost, probably because a broken optical fiber. Total proposed 
to replace the sensors, but since that would take 9 months, to start the injection in the meantime. 
Without the sensors at the bottom of the well, the seismic monitoring network would comprise only 
the 7 sub-surface sensors, buried 200 meters. The permit specified that it was the operator's 
responsibility to determine the necessary number of sensors. Total's case that the incomplete 
network would be enough to monitor the site integrity was reviewed positively by two independant 
experts teams, so the Prefect did not cancel the autorization.
Municipal elections were held in March 2008.The project was not a stake of the campaign debates, 
as it was a politically risky topic with little to gain. The newly elected mayor in Jurançon initially 
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took a stance against the project, backed by an unanimous vote of the municipal council. The 
building permit for works needed at the injection site was not granted. Eventually, the mayor 
learned more about the project and its safety for the populations and became favorable to it. He 
negociated a partnership agreement with Total, signed in April 2009, saying that Total gives 
1.5 million euros for projects in environmental protection, the development of energy efficiency and 
renewables as well as social, education, culture and sports. There are no injection taxes.
The capture, transport and storage project was permitted on May 13th, 2009, 27 months after the 
initial press conference. On January 11th, 2010, Valérie Letard, State secretary in charge of green 
technologies and climate negociations, with Christophe de Margerie, Total CEO, inaugurated the 
carbon capture and storage research pilot.
5. Discussion, lessons learned and conclusions
In this case, Total demonstrated a strong will to engage a concertation, allocating significant 
resources early on: hiring a consulting firm and allocating senior engineers time to answer the 
questions. The concertation covered the whole territory from Lacq, where acceptability was likely 
from the start, to Jurançon where things were more delicate. The social conditions were very 
favorable to the project. For two generations, the operator has been the first economic and therefore 
political power in the area, and has consistently demonstrated that it could control higher risks. The 
project answered local needs for economic development directly and indirectly, in the long run 
context of the gas field depletion. Research on CCS is supported nationally and internationally by 
scientists and States. All these reasons contribute to explain why the permit was obtained.
Still there are lessons to be learned. Total's position would have been stronger if its permit request 
had been expertised by a different team, and if it had more specific long-term plans. Because 
concertation meetings were held before elections, the local officials could only take a non-
commited stance. Using a parisian consulting firm to moderate the discussion, and employing 
hostesses to hand out the information packages was not appreciated by the people of Jurançon. 
Total, following the advice of the president of the national commission on public debates, did not 
mass-mail the community with information on the project. Consequently, citizens came to the 
meetings to receive information, not to defend a stance in a debate. Another reason why the public 
participation in the discussion was low is that smaller formats might have been more interactive.
This case exposes the difficulty of modern governance. A balance between concertation, 
information and representativity has to be found for each issue, depending on local ethics and 
customs as well science and technology. As concluded in [17] this balance can only be found 
pragmatically. Technology policy is progressive and interactive, it needs projects to go forward. The 
project contributed to the regulation framework itself. The CLIS worked well, but the formal public 
survey came late in the procedure and did not interest much the citizens. The local media did not 
relay much the information about the public survey, not contributing to a meaningfull participation 
of the public. Even on a technically very constrained project, there was something to negotiate. Risk 
management studies were revised, and landscape integration in the environment was improved. 
Landscaping is the sensory interface with the community, and must be adapted locally anyway.
It might have been presumed that since geological storage is a highly technical subject, there was 
some rationality in technocratic decision making, where executive powers are delegated to elected 
representatives and State's engineers. Most citizens know little to no geoscience, and would sensibly 
err on the side of too much precaution when asked about an R&D project, since research means that 
there is a knowledge gap somewhere. In this case, the argument needs discussion, since some 
neighbors retired from Total were perfectly knowledgeable about the Rousse reservoir. We observed 
that the citizens tied with Total, retired or still active, exercised self-restraint in the public debates.
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The case also highlights the issue of independance. As for many new technologies or drug 
assessments, CCS experts generally have an interest in the development of CCS. And local people 
in the administration, the industry and even the environmental associations mostly belong to the 
same social network. We believe that far from being a problem, strong communication links on the 
human side is an asset for governance. Beyond sharing knowledge, a key to the successful co-
construction of a social innovation is the widening and deepening of the social network behind it. In 
this case, giving information empowered the local community to act. Having concerned citizens ask 
pointed questions to the experts balances power. The fact that the concertation led the neighbors to 
create an association of opponents probably improved the quality of the CLIS debates.
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